How real is the “epidemic” of autism? How much of the increase in the number of diagnoses have to do with factors other than a real increase in the number?
I am going to take some time with this paper. If you want the short version of this post–about 26% of the increase in autism counts in California can be attributed to changes in diagnositic practices leading to people being classified autistic (or autistic plus MR) who were classified with mental retardation by pre-1992 standards.
Perhaps the most used dataset for exploring the increase in autism, especially by amateur epidemiologists, is that of the California Department of Developmental Services, or CDDS. The CDDS serves people with developmental disabilities (not just autism) within the state of California. The CDDS made much of its data freely available. While the CDDS data show a large increase in the number of people getting services for autism as a developmental disability, it is difficult to ascertain how much (if any) of this is due to a real increase in the number of people who actually are autistic. This is because it is very hard to know how important external factors are in changing the administrative prevalence of autism.
Many factors influence the prevalence of autism. These include broadening of the criteria for what is called “autism”, such as the change in the 1990’s to include PDD-NOS and Asperger Syndrome in the Autism Spectrum Disorders.
Recently, Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche found that “three artefacts—younger age at diagnosis, change in the accepted criteria and inclusion of milder cases—accounted for about one-third of a 12-year rise in incidence in California.”
Many people have misrepresented Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche as showing that there has been a “true” increase in the autism prevalence when, in fact, they state quite clearly “Other artifacts have yet to be quantified, and as a result, the extent to which the continued rise represents a true increase in the occurrence of autism remains unclear.”
One of the artifacts that was not quantified by Hertz-Picciotto and Delwiche was the possibility of diagnostic change and accretion. When diagnostic practices change, a person who would have one diagnosis in one time period might get a different diagnosis in another.
For example, a common question that comes up is this: how many people diagnosed with autism today would have been given a diagnosis of mental retardation 20 years ago?
That is essentially the question posed by Marissa King and Peter Bearman of Columbia University in the paper
The paper, Diagnostic change and the increased prevalence of autism.
This has the possibility to be a very important paper. I don’t think I am stretching when I state this as this paper was published together with commentary from no fewer than five four well known research groups.
Here’s the abstract:
Background Increased autism prevalence rates have generated considerable concern. However, the contribution of changes in diagnostic practices to increased prevalence rates has not been thoroughly examined. Debates over the role of diagnostic substitution also continue. California has been an important test case in these controversies. The objective of this study was to determine the extent to which the increased prevalence of autism in California has been driven by changes in diagnostic practices, diagnostic substitution and diagnostic accretion.
Methods Retrospective case record examination of 7003 patients born before 1987 with autism who were enrolled with the California Department of Developmental Services between 1992 and 2005 was carried out. Of principal interest were 631 patients with a sole diagnosis of mental retardation (MR) who subsequently acquired a diagnosis of autism. The outcome of interest was the probability of acquiring a diagnosis of autism as a result of changes in diagnostic practices was calculated. The probability of diagnostic change is then used to model the proportion of the autism caseload arising from changing diagnostic practices.
Results The odds of a patient acquiring an autism diagnosis were elevated in periods in which the practices for diagnosing autism changed. The odds of change in years in which diagnostic practices changed were 1.68 [95% confidence interval (CI) 1.11–2.54], 1.55 (95% CI 1.03–2.34), 1.58 (95% CI 1.05–2.39), 1.82 (95% CI 1.23–2.7) and 1.61 (95% CI 1.09–2.39). Using the probability of change between 1992 and 2005 to generalize to the population with autism, it is estimated that 26.4% (95% CI 16.25–36.48) of the increased autism caseload in California is uniquely associated with diagnostic change through a single pathway—individuals previously diagnosed with MR.
Conclusion Changes in practices for diagnosing autism have had a substantial effect on autism caseloads, accounting for one-quarter of the observed increase in prevalence in California between 1992 and 2005.
The authors started by looking at the individual records for the 7003 clients of the CDDS born before 1987 who had diagnoses of autism at any time in their CDDS records. These individuals would be at least 8 years old by the time the DSM-IV criteria for autism came out in 1994, so they should have already been diagnosed with autism by that time.
What they found was that 631 individuals started out with a diagnosis of mental retardation and later received a diagnosis of autism. 95% of these individuals retained the MR diagnosis. I.e. most moved from “autism” to a dual diagnoses of autism+MR.
They also found that 89 individuals “lost” their autism diagnosis. They are not discussed in detail, so we can’t tell if they held other diagnoses after “losing” their autism diagnosis.
The authors plotted the number of individuals who changed from MR to autism or autism+MR by year. They claim that the number is higher in years when significant changes in diagnostic practices were introduced.
A peak is fairly clear for 1994, when the DSM-IV was issued. Whether this peak and the others are real is a matter for discussion (as in Dr. Hertz-Picciotto’s commentaruy)
Some of the findings the authors reported are very interesting.
Examining the control variables, we see that the level of intellectual impairment of clients had a significant effect on the likelihood of observing diagnostic change. The relationship between severity and the odds of change appears to be non-linear with moderate and profound severity to be at greatest risk for diagnostic change.
The CDDS lists intellectual impairment by the categories mild, moderate, severe and profound. It strikes me as strange that mild ID is not the area with the highest odds of change. It is very strange that there is no clear trend that the odds of change/accretion go up (or down) with severity of intellectual disability.
Another interesting observation:
Changes in evaluation scores, which capture many of the requirements for an autism diagnosis, surprisingly had little discernable effect on the likelihood of diagnostic change [OR 1.02; 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.00–1.04].
This is quite strange to me as well. One would think, perhaps, that the lower the evaluation score, the more likely that someone would have been undiagnosed.
Or, to put it another way, why weren’t the more “obviously” autistic individuals identified before the diagnostic changes?
Finally, race and year of birth were also significantly associated with the odds of change. Persons born in later years, who were younger, were more likely to experience diagnostic accretion or substitution. Finally, African–Americans
were considerably less likely than Caucasians to have a change in diagnostic status.
To me, this speaks to the idea that not everyone who qualifies for an autism diagnosis under the changes is getting one. I.e. the CDDS still has a clients in this older cohort who are misclassified as MR instead of autism. For example, 0lder clients are less likely to have a family member to advocate for them, and are less likely to see a change in services under autism vs. MR classifications.
The authors then take this “micro level” data (looking at individuals) and apply their findings on a “macro level” (looking at groups of people). In other words, the usethese data to predict how much of the increase in CDDS caseload is due to this one pathway–shift from MR to autism. The results are shown in Figure 4, copied below.
They find that by 2005, 26% of the increase in the CDDS caseload can be attributed to the shift from MR to autism.
One important point the authors make is the difference between diagnostic substitution and diagnostic accretion. An example of substitution is an individual having his/her diagnosis change from MR to autism. An example of accretion is when an individual has autism added to the already existing MR diagnosis.
Accretion is harder to discern on a group (macro) level, since one would not see the MR count drop coincident with the autism increase. The authors have included both in their definition of diagnostic change.
The authors note that the MR to autism pathway is not the only possibility.
Diagnostic substitution and diagnostic accretion along other pathways, such as developmental language disorder or other learning disabilities, may be contributing to an increase in higher functioning cases. In a study applying contemporary diagnostic standards and practices to persons with a history of developmental language disorder 21% (8/38) of the individuals met the criteria for autism and 11% (4/38) met the criteria for milder forms of ASD. Thus, there are multiple pathways to an autism diagnosis from multiple disorders that contribute to increases along various parts of the spectrum. In this article, we have considered only one pathway and one part of the spectrum
In other words, more of the increase in the CDDS caseload may be due to diagnostic changes, but in ways not covered by this paper.
One factor the authors do not appear to be taking into account is the large regional disparities within California. The administrative prevalence in the CDDS system varies wildly depending on which part of the stat one looks at. In general, rural areas have much lower administrative prevalence values than urban areas, for example.
The authors’ concluding paragraph:
We have estimated that one in four children who are diagnosed with autism today would not have been diagnosed with autism in 1993. This finding does not rule out the possible contributions of other etiological factors, including environmental toxins, genetics or their interaction to the increased prevalence of autism. In fact, it helps us to recognize that such factors surely play an important role in increasing prevalence. There is no reason to believe that any of these frameworks are wrong and many reasons to believe that the increase in autism prevalence is in fact the outcome of multiple self-reinforcing processes. However, this study demonstrates that subsequent explanations for the increased prevalence of autism must take into account the effect of diagnostic change.
I think this is quite good–the paper does not rule out a true increase in autism prevalence. It does demonstrate that factors like diagnositic change and accretion are real and significant.
Many factors are involved with the increase in autism prevalence, including that in the CDDS data. Just because the number of people identified with autism went up doesn’t mean that all of that number is due to a real increase in the number of people who are autistic.
King, M., & Bearman, P. (2009). Diagnostic change and the increased prevalence of autism International Journal of Epidemiology DOI: 10.1093/ije/dyp261





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